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It has twenty-two pages of maps by the famous geographer Habe nicht, and is supplemented by sixty pages of geographic statistics, brought down to date by H. Wichmann.

The maps are copper engravings of the highest artistic quality, and most exquisitely printed on the finest plate paper. The workmanship puts to blush anything ever brought out in this country. For fineness of line, accuracy of detail, mass of data entered, and for beauty of coloring, these maps are unsurpassed in atlases of any size.

The point of view in the presentation of geography has been materially changed in recent years, owing to the splendid work done in the study of the evolution of land forms and the consequent rise of the science of Physiography. This makes geography dynamic in contrast to the static conceptions of the science in the past. More and more the forces at work in physiography are seen to be ever present factors in shaping the course of human events, economic and historic. The new point of view is slowly coming into our education and our literature. The latest comer is a "Reader in Physical Geography," by Professor Richard E. Dodge. It is a book for beginners, intelligently written, and will make good reading for the laity in other lines, who wish to know the way in which a physiographer looks at his problems.

J. PAUL GOODE.

Philadelphia.

Social Justice. A Critical Essay. By WESTEL WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY, Ph. D. Pp. xii, 385. Price, \$3.00. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1900.

The endeavor of Dr. Willoughby is to bring to the analysis of the concepts underlying our modern industrial and legal system the assistance of transcendental principles. The touchstone of the modern system is contained in the question, Is it just? The problem of social justice presents itself to the author as being concerned with (1) the proper distribution of economic goods; (2) the harmonizing of the principles of liberty and law, of freedom and coercion.

At the outset of his inquiry the author is concerned with the nature of the rights involved. He discards the antique lumber of natural rights and recognizes rights as relative. Since rights are relative it follows that the standards of social justice are to be obtained not from introspection, but from a study of social conditions. Of necessity his study of social conditions lays special stress on the economic phase. He considers the ideals of equality under the various headings of spiritual, natural, civil, political, social and economic. He finds that in the case of economic equality, as in the case of the other ideals that

have been advanced, there is an inherent fallacy and that the true principle of distributive justice is to be found in the idea of proportionality—"the proportioning of rewards in each particular case according to some ascertainable conditions of time, place or person." The next problem attacked is that of the justification for the existence of property. Here the sum of the investigation is that expediency is the final criterion. The author does not believe in the distinction between distributive and corrective justice. Justice is concerned with desert, and all justice is distributive. In discussing the right of coercion exerted by society he finds its justification in social expediency. The chapter on punitive justice discusses the various theories—retributive, deterrent, preventive and reformatory. The retributive theory he wholly rejects. This theory predicates an exactness of knowledge with reference to the moral responsibility of the individual which is beyond the scope of any tribunal. Then again the theories of modern criminal sociology still further put the theory out of court, since they confront us with an instinctively criminal type. The other theories—deterrent, preventive and reformatory—so interact in practice that it is difficult to disentangle them.

The summing up of the matter is that the criterion of the justice of an existing institution is to be found in its social utility.

The work is not concerned with the development of theoretic principles alone. The author has in mind throughout the testing of his conclusions in the light of experience. It will at once appear that the position he occupies with reference to the relativity of rights is opposed to the acceptance of the tenets of those systems which, like socialism and the individualistic Georgian doctrine, predicate the existence of a body of natural rights. As regards state interference the author occupies a position of broadminded individualism. He is of opinion that the development of society will, of necessity, bring with it a constant increase of the scope of educational and regulative functions. The analysis of justice is not without its word on the great question of to-day; for it tells us that "it lies within the legitimate province of an enlightened nation to compel—if compulsion be the only and the best means available—the less civilized races to enter into that better social and political life, the advantage of which their own ignorance either prevents them from seeing, or securing if seen."

In the analysis of the author social expediency furnishes the criterion of existing systems. But there is also introduced the complexity of a duality of standard which is not essential. While social expediency is accepted as the test it is also stated that the existence of the state is justifiable only in so far as it assists in the development of our

best selves. There is no necessary antagonism in these positions; but the author's treatment suggests an antagonism. Speaking in another connection he says that the legislator is concerned not only with acts which are socially inexpedient but also with those which are considered wicked when judged by his moral canons. But is it not true that the individual's conception of right and of wrong is an outcome of environmental conditions, and would it not also be true that in legislating on what may, on the face of it, appeal to him as *mala in se* the lawmaker is in reality acting upon a conception which has become his through constant social accretions? The method of the author suggests that the transcendental analysis of the aims of the state gives the higher ideal and points out the way in which alone our best selves can be realized. But may it not also be claimed that the evolutionary point of view suggests that ideals are being moulded and reformed, not by the objective physical environment alone, as the author in his discussion of the evolutionary point of view would seem to suggest, but also through the influence of a psychical environment as well? In other words, is the ideal of a high conception of personality incompatible with the evolutionary system? While the author finds that rights are relative to conditions, he introduces into his analysis the conception of an abstract right, an abstract principle concerned with "right actions . . . (which) . . . are founded ultimately upon eternal principles of morality flowing from the essential character of the Divine reason." But if we look for the universality which this transcendental phrase would predicate do we not find that the ideas of right and of wrong vary from age to age, from clime to clime, and that the principles of right and of wrong which survive are those which have social utility and are in harmony with social expediency. giving to the word expediency that broad sense it must have throughout the discussion?

SIMON J. MCLEAN.

University of Arkansas.